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Abstract
This article examines the effects of market structure on the variety of research
projects undertaken and the amount of duplication of research. A characteriza-
tion of the equilibrium market portfolio of R&D projects and the socially optimal
portfolio is provided. It is shown that a merger decreases the variety of developed
projects and decreases the amount of duplication of research. An increase in the
intensity of competition among firms leads to an increase in the variety of developed
projects and a decrease in the amount of duplication of research.
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1 Introduction
In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice blocked the proposed merger of Lockheed Martin
and Northrop Grumman, the largest blocked merger in the U.S. history at the time. The
merger would have reduced the number of firms supplying aircraft and electronic systems
to the Department of Defense from three (including Boeing) to only two. According
to Robinson (1999) and Rubinfeld and Hoven (2001), one of the main reasons why the
Department of Justice, supported by the Department of Defense, opposed the merger was
the concern that the merger would have had negative effects on innovation. However, the
issue was not so much with the amount of funds invested in innovation, the bulk of which
comes from the Department of Defense anyway (Rubinfeld and Hoven, 2001). Rather,
the principal concern was that reducing the number of firms in the industry would reduce
the diversity of approaches to innovation.
This article develops a model where the effects of such a merger on the variety of
approaches to innovation and the amount of duplicative research can be studied explic-
itly. From society’s point of view, higher variety of research projects being developed is
desirable because it increases the probability that the innovation will be discovered. On
the other hand, more duplication of research projects is also desirable because it implies
stronger product market competition ex post and lower deadweight loss. The market
R&D portfolio is a function which captures how many firms are investing in each of the
possible projects, and the variety of approaches is the fraction of projects which are de-
veloped by at least one firm. Of course, both more variety and more duplication are
costly. The main object of analysis will be the market R&D portfolio. The model will
allow us to study how a change in the market structure will change the equilibrium R&D
portfolio.
The main model assumes that there are N symmetric firms competing in a market. In
the first stage, the firms can invest in innovation. There is a set of heterogeneous research
projects and firms simultaneously choose the subset they wish to develop. The innovation
is assumed to be drastic1 and the discovery procedure is stochastic. All approaches are
1Innovation is drastic if whenever at least one firm innovates, firms without the innovation cannot
compete. This assumption was introduced by Arrow (1962); see also Gilbert (2006). This assumption is
not needed for the characterization of the equilibrium and is relaxed in Section 7.
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ex ante equally likely to be successful, but ex post only one approach will be successful.
The approaches differ only in the cost needed to pursue them. There are no spillovers
or patents. Each firm which invested in the successful approach receives the innovation
whereas each firm that did not invest in the successful project receives nothing from its
research. In the second stage, the firms compete on the product market either with or
without the innovation.
As all approaches are ex ante equally likely to be successful, the firms have an incentive
to develop only the cheapest projects. However, the number of firms developing any given
project also determines the number of firms which will compete on the product market
with the new technology. Thus, when choosing which projects to develop the firms face
a trade off — cheaper approaches cost less to develop but will in equilibrium attract
more competitors. I show that an equilibrium of the investment game always exists and
that the equilibrium market R&D portfolio is uniquely determined. I provide a simple
characterization of the equilibrium R&D portfolio and show that it follows a step function
— with more expensive approaches being developed by fewer firms.
The characterization of the R&D portfolio is then used to derive comparative statics.
I show that a decrease in the number of firms weakly decreases the variety of approaches
to innovation and also weakly decreases the amount of duplication. Hence, a merger
leads to a weakly decreasing variety of approaches to innovation. A policy implication
drawn from this analysis is that the competition authorities should take into account
the negative effects of a merger on the variety of approaches to innovation, in part giving
theoretical foundation to the concern expressed in the Lockheed-Northrop case. However,
if a merger leads to efficiency gains, this result need not hold.
Next, I consider the effects of a change in the intensity of competition between firms. I
define an increase in the intensity of competition as any exogenous change which decreases
firm profits.2 An increase in the intensity of competition is shown to increase the variety
of approaches to innovation and to decrease the amount of duplication in equilibrium.
Thus, an increase in the intensity of product market competition leads to more specialized
R&D portfolios. This illustrates why an increase in the intensity of competition can both
2Similar approach is taken in Schmidt (1997) and Schmutzler (2013).
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increase and decrease the amount of resources invested in R&D — if the reduction in
duplication of research efforts is greater than the increase in variety of research efforts,
the total amount invested in R&D will decrease. If the opposite is true, the total amount
invested in R&D will increase.
I provide a characterization of the socially optimal R&D portfolio and compare it with
the market R&D portfolio. I derive the condition under which the market investment in
the variety of research approaches is optimal, too low or too high. Similarly, I derive the
condition under which the market duplication of research approaches is optimal, too low
or too high. I show that in a large class of homogeneous goods models, the market will
always underinvest in the variety of approaches to process innovation. This result implies
that there is a role for government subsidies of R&D. Furthermore, it implies that the
subsidies should be targeted at research projects with high development costs and high
potential payoffs.
The main body of the article assumes that the innovation is drastic, firms are symmet-
ric, have unlimited budgets and use only pure strategies. I consider the effects of relaxing
these assumptions in turn and show that the equilibrium structure is in general robust.
In particular, the assumption that the innovation is drastic is not necessary. In Section
7, I provide a characterization of the equilibrium portfolio without assuming drastic in-
novation and show that it is qualitatively similar to the equilibrium portfolio when the
innovation is assumed to be drastic. However, comparative statics become significantly
more complex. Section 7 shows that similar comparative static results can be obtained
without the drastic innovation assumption if instead additional assumptions are imposed
on the reduced form payoffs.
The outline of the article is as follows. In Section 2, a brief overview of the related
literature is provided. Section 3 describes the model. The equilibrium is characterized in
Section 4. Comparative statics are analyzed in Section 5. The socially optimal portfolio
and its relation to the market portfolio are analyzed in Section 6. In Section 7, I relax a
number of assumptions made in the main body of the article. Section 8 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix. Additional extensions are in the Online Appendix.
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2 Related literature
This article contributes to the literature on the relationship between market structure
and the incentives of the firms to invest in innovation. A large part of this literature
studies the amount of resources that firms invest in R&D. Depending on the specifics of
the model used, the literature finds that the competition in the marketplace can increase,
decrease or have non-monotone effects on the amount invested in R&D. For surveys of
this vast literature see Gilbert (2006), Sena (2004) and Cayseele (1998). Vives (2008)
and Schmutzler (2013) provide comprehensive studies for a range of market competition
models and demand structures. Important contributions to this literature have been
made from the endogenous growth literature, particularly from the models of step-by-
step innovations (see for example Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005)). This
article contributes to this literature by providing a model which allows us to consider
how the variety and duplication of approaches to research change as the market structure
changes, and how it relates to the socially optimal amount of variety and duplication of
research.
This article is more closely related to the part of the literature on competition and
innovation that examines how competing firms choose some aspect of the research strat-
egy. Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986) and Klette and Meza (1986) consider a model
where undertaking research is like drawing a random variable. The maximum realization
of the random variables determines the winner of the race (winner takes all) but also both
private and social payoff. Firms choose a parameter of the density function, which de-
termines the variance and in some scenarios the correlation of the research output. This
parameter is interpreted as a research strategy of the firm. Dasgupta and Maskin (1987)
consider a similar model. Results obtained by these models depend on the assumptions
made about the distribution of research outcomes, but in a large class of cases, firms un-
dertake excessive risk (because firms care who wins the race, whereas society only cares
about the best research output; however see also Cabral (1994) and Kwon (2010) who
find that the market is biased against risky research). At the same time, if reducing cor-
relation is costly, firms will choose research strategies that are too correlated, as firms will
not internalize the benefit low correlation confers to its opponent when its own research
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output is low. In this setting, the firms can choose only one research project (i.e., each
firm chooses one parameter of the density function), hence these models cannot examine
the variety of research projects. At the same time, in these articles the choice of corre-
lation of the outcomes is interpreted as a measure of duplication. In the present article,
duplication of research is literal — the firms can choose to pursue the same project.
Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) study an interesting model where two players search
for a treasure which is hidden in one box among a set of boxes. Each player has an
endogenously chosen capacity determining the number of boxes he can examine in each
period. The player that first discovers the treasure, keeps it. The research strategy is
the choice of the boxes which will be examined in each period. In both this article and
in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997), the players can choose both the intensity and the
location of search. However, the equilibrium predictions are different. The main result of
Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) is that the search will be completely random, whereas
in this article pure strategy equilibria will always exist. The reason for this difference
is that in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) the search continues until the treasure is
found and in this article the search lasts only one period. When there are multiple search
periods, there is an incentive for players preempt their opponent by searching exactly
those boxes that the opponents intends to search in the next period. This incentive
destroys any equilibrium in which the search is not completely random. Clearly, this
incentive does not exist when search lasts only one period, in which case the choice of
boxes is driven by their equilibrium net expected value. In this sense, these articles are
complementary. In addition, this article is concerned with how the research incentives
are affected by the market structure, which is not studied in Fershtman and Rubinstein
(1997).
Chatterjee and Evans (2004) present a dynamic model where two firms are searching
for an innovation in a model of a hidden treasure. There are two possible research projects
and only one can yield the innovation, with the winner take all feature. However, unlike
Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) and this article, developing the “right” project yields
the innovation only with some exogenously given probability. They find that the amount
of correlation between research of the two firms can be too high or too low depending on
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the nature of asymmetry between the two research paths. Akcigit and Liu (forthcoming)
also consider a setup with two firms and two possible avenues for research, one is more
profitable (in expectation) but may result in a dead-end and another which always yields
a less profitable innovation if it is researched long enough. As opposed to Chatterjee and
Evans (2004) they assume that firms cannot observe which research path their competitor
is pursuing and they find that firms duplicate dead-end research and at the same time
leave the risky research path too early. In contrast to the present article, this strand of
literature assumes that firms can research only one project at a time, so the question of
the choice of variety of research projects and the amount of duplicative research does not
arise. This is, however, the main focus of the present article.
Most closely related to the present article is the literature on multiproject innovation,
which has been studied by Sah and Stiglitz (1987) and in the related work by Reynolds and
Isaac (1992) and Farrell, Gilbert, and Katz (2003). Sah and Stiglitz (1987) assume that all
projects are identical. The probability of success of any individual project depends only on
the effort invested in this project and is independent of anything that might be happening
with other projects. Using this setting and the Bertrand model of product market, Sah
and Stiglitz (1987) show that the number of projects is invariant to the number of firms
in the market, a result they refer to as the “strong invariance result.” Reynolds and Isaac
(1992) and Farrell, Gilbert, and Katz (2003) explore this setting further and show that
the invariance result is sensitive to type of product market competition. In particular,
they show that the invariance result does not hold under Cournot competition.
The main difference between this article and the literature in tradition of Sah and
Stiglitz (1987) is that here projects are assumed to be heterogeneous and that more than
one firm can invest in the same project. Hence, firms need to decide which projects to
develop and have to do so in a strategic manner, keeping in mind which projects their
competitors are developing. In this article, R&D portfolio is the main object of interest,
whereas in the Sah and Stiglitz (1987) tradition it does not appear at all. There, projects
are identical and it is immaterial which projects firms or their opponents develop. Thus,
the model of Sah and Stiglitz (1987) does not capture the effects of variety of projects or
the duplication of projects which is the main focus of analysis here.
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3 A model of stochastic multiproject innovation
There are N symmetric firms3 that compete in the pre-innovation market and that can
invest in innovation. There is a continuum of research projects Ω, but only one project
jˆ ∈ Ω leads to the innovation.4 We can normalize the set of possible projects to the
unit interval, that is Ω = [0, 1). I assume that the successful project is drawn from the
uniform distribution over the set [0, 1). Furthermore, each project has a fixed cost of
development. Investing less than this cost means that firm will fail to develop the project
and investing more will not improve the probability of the project being successful. In
essence, the innovation mechanism is a lottery — developing different projects is akin to
buying lottery tickets, the more lottery tickets you have the higher the probability you
will win, but offering to pay more for a ticket will not increase its chances of winning.
This fixed cost, fixed probability mechanism is similar to the one developed in Quirmbach
(1993), the difference being that here firms can invest in multiple projects.
The projects are assumed to differ in terms of the investment cost needed to develop
them. Denote the cost of developing project j ∈ [0, 1) as C(j). We can view C as a func-
tion such that C : [0, 1)→ R+. I assume that C is continuous, differentiable and strictly
increasing. The fact that the function C is increasing is simply a matter of ordering the
projects j in the right way, strictness is assumed so that marginal reasoning will yield
unique results. Continuity is assumed to make the problem more tractable. Furthermore,
assume limj→1C(j) =∞. As rewards from innovation are finite, this assumption ensures
that firms will not want to invest in all possible projects. No exogenous restrictions are
placed on the research budgets of firms, except in the Online Appendix B.3, which studies
the consequences of limited research budgets and costly financing of research.
There are two possible levels of technology — old and new. The new technology is
available only to the firms which invested in the successful innovation project, whereas
the old technology is available to all firms. Let n ≤ N be the number of firms which
developed the new technology. Denote with R(n,N) the payoff of a firm with the new
technology, where n is the number of firms with the new technology and N is the total
3Asymmetric firms are studied in Section 7.
4The stochastic mechanism used to model innovation is adapted from Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
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number of firms. Analogously, denote with r(n,N) the profits of a firm with the old
technology. The difference between process and product innovations is not explicitly
modeled. As long as the product market payoffs can be expressed in terms of the reward
functions, the present model can be used to study both types of innovation.
Next, I list assumptions that will be used in the article. However, note that only
Assumption 1 is used throughout.
Assumption 1 (Non-increasing reward to subsequent innovators).
For all N and n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} it holds:
R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N) ≥ R(n+ 1, N)− r(n,N).
This assumption implies that the gain from innovation does not increase as the number
of innovators increases. It captures the intuition that a firm prefers that its competitors
do not innovate. Thus innovations are strategic substitutes. Although intuitive, this
assumption needs to be checked for each model of product market competition. The
consequences of relaxing this assumption will be considered in Section 7.
I assume that the innovation is drastic, in the sense that if there is at least one
firm which has successfully developed the innovation, all firms which do not have the
innovation cannot compete. That is, the laggards receive a payoff of zero and do not
exert competitive pressure on the firms which have successfully innovated. For process
innovations, this implies that the price of a monopolist with the innovation is below the
marginal cost of any firm without the innovation. For product innovation this implies that
the old product is made obsolete and it cannot be sold on the market. This assumption
will be relaxed in a Section 7, where the equilibrium will be characterized for non-drastic
innovations and robustness of comparative static effects will be discussed. In the notation
used here we have:
Assumption 2 (Drastic innovation).
For all n,N and N ′ such that 1 ≤ n ≤ N ≤ N ′ it holds: (i) r(n,N) = 0 and
(ii) R(n,N) = R(n,N ′).
Expression (i) ensures that laggards have zero profits and (ii) ensures that laggards
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do not exert competitive pressure on the innovators. Under Assumption 2, R(n,N)
is constant for any N , so from now on just R(n) will be used to indicate the payoff
of an innovator when there are n innovators. Furthermore, if Assumption 2 holds then
Assumption 1 simplifies to the following two conditions: R(n) ≥ R(n+1) for all n ≥ 1 and
R(1)− r(0, N) ≥ R(2). The first expression states that the payoff per innovator weakly
decreases as the number of innovators increases. The second expression states that the
incentives of a prospective monopolist are greater than those of a single innovator when
two firms innovate.
Assumption 3. For every N it holds: r(0, N) ≥ r(0, N + 1).
This assumption states that as the number of firms which are active in the pre-
innovation market increases, the profits of each individual firm do not increase. The
intuition is simple: the additional firm will either not be competitive and have no effect
on the profits of other firms, or it will put competitive pressure on other firms and decrease
their profits, but it cannot increase their profits.
The unmodeled product market game that determines payoffs to the firms, R(n,N)
and r(n,N), also determines the consumer surplus. This consumer surplus is the result
of the competition among N firms, n of which have the new technology, and who face
some demand curve on the product market. Denote this consumer surplus in reduced
form with CS(n,N). Then, the social welfare, when there are n innovators, is the sum
of consumer and producer surplus: W (n) = CS(n,N) + nR(n,N) + (N − n)r(n,N).5
That is, W (0) denotes the welfare without the innovation, W (1) denotes the welfare when
there is only one firm with the innovation, and so on.
Assumption 4 (Non-increasing welfare returns).
For every n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} it holds W (n)−W (n− 1) ≥ W (n+ 1)−W (n).
Each firm is assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize its expected profits. Profit
maximization requires that firms either invest zero in a project or exactly the amount
that is required to open the project. Thus, we can identify the strategy of a firm simply
by the set of the projects in which it invests. Denote the strategy of a firm i with Ii and
5We can suppress the dependence of W on N as N will be fixed whenever welfare is analyzed.
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call it the investment plan of firm i. In principle, Ii could be any measurable subset of
the unit interval or the empty set. To simplify exposition, assume that unless it is empty,
the set Ii consists only of a finite number of intervals, each closed from below and open
from above.6 Formally, the strategy space of firm i is the set Ii where:
Ii :=
{
Ii ⊂ [0, 1) : Ii = ∪k¯k=1[ak, bk)
}
∪ {∅} ,
for k¯ ∈ N and 0 ≤ ak < bk < 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}.
In particular, note that this assumption ensures that the investment plan will not
contain any isolated zero-mass points.
Let I = [I1, . . . , IN ] be a vector of investment plans of all N firms. Define the function
indicating the number of firms investing in a project, given a vector of investment plans
I, as n(j, I) : [0, 1)→ N0 as:
n(j, I) =
N∑
i=1
1
(
j ∈ Ii
)
,
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
Let Ici := [0, 1) \ Ii. The expected profit of a firm i is then
pii(I) = −
∫
Ii
C(j)dj +
∫
Ii
R(n(j, I))dj +
∫
Ici
r(n(j, I), N)dj. (1)
The first part of the equation above represents the investment costs of firm i, the
second part gives the expected profits from the new technology, whereas the third part
gives the expected profits from the old technology. By Assumption 2, r(n(j, I), N) = 0
whenever n(j, I) > 0. However, it will be positive whenever n(j, I) = 0, which will occur
in equilibrium with positive probability.7
When N = 1, that is, when there is a monopolist in the market, the above becomes
6Because adding or removing zero-mass points does not change the payoff of any of the firms, allowing
Ii to be general would mean that all statements regarding the properties of the equilibrium would have
to be qualified by “almost everywhere”. This assumption does not affect the mechanics of the model.
For any measurable investment plan Ii which does not satisfy the assumption above, there always exists
plan I ′i which does satisfy the assumption and only differs from Ii by zero-mass points, hence delivers
the same payoff to all firms.
7Furthermore, the magnitude of r(0, N) will determine the strength of the Arrow replacement effect,
which is crucial for the equilibrium variety of research projects.
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a pure maximization problem. When there are more firms in the market we have to
consider the effects of strategic interaction among firms. Specifically, n(j, I) depends on
the actions of other firms and thus the expected profit of one firm depends on the actions
of other firms.
Finally, assume that investment in innovation is profitable. That is R(1)− r(0, N) >
C(0). This assumption guarantees positive investments in the equilibrium. If this assump-
tion was not met, even the monopolist’s return on the investment in the cheapest project
would not justify its cost. As C(j) is strictly increasing and rewards are non-increasing
in n, then no project could be profitable. Thus, if this assumption failed there would be
a simple equilibrium in which firms did not invest at all.
The model is developed and analyzed in general terms. In the appendix A.10, I
provide an example with three firms, process innovation and Cournot competition, which
shows how the general model can be applied to a more specific setting. In the example,
I analyze the effects of a merger, a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition as well
as compare the market portfolio of R&D projects with the socially optimal portfolio.
4 Equilibrium
The vector of investment plans summarizes all decisions of all firms that are relevant for
this problem. A vector of investment plans I∗ is a pure strategy equilibrium (PSE) if no
firm can increase its expected profit by unilaterally choosing an alternative investment
plan I ′i. That is I
∗ is a pure strategy equilibrium if, for any firm i, there does not exist
an investment plan I ′i such that pii(I
′
i, I
∗
−i) > pii(I
∗). In the main text, I will only consider
pure strategy equilibria. Mixed strategy equilibria exist and are considered in a special
case in the Online Appendix B.2. As it is shown there, the insights from pure strategy
equilibria, both in terms of the structure of the equilibrium and the comparative static
effect, are robust.
Proposition 1 (Existence, non-uniqueness and equivalence of equilibria).
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then:
1. A pure strategy equilibrium always exists.
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2. If I∗ is a PSE and 0 < n(j, I∗) < N for some j ∈ [0, 1), then infinitely many PSE
exist.
3. If there are multiple PSE they all result in the same market portfolio of research
projects. That is, if I∗1 and I
∗
2 are PSE investment plans, then n(j, I
∗
1 ) = n(j, I
∗
2 )
for all j ∈ [0, 1). Furthermore, if I∗1 is a PSE then any investment plan I∗3 such
that n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I
∗
3 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1) is also a PSE.
An equilibrium in pure strategies will always exist. However, typically there will
also exist infinitely many equilibria. The proof of statement 2 in Proposition 1 (see the
Appendix A.1) reveals the nature of the multiplicity. In equilibrium, identities of firms
investing in any given project are in general not determined, only the number of firms
investing is determined. Only when either all firms invest in a project or no firm invests
in a project, we can infer the behavior of individual firms. Thus, when 0 < n(j, I∗) < N
for some j ∈ [0, 1), there are projects for which the identities of firms investing are not
determined and as there is an infinite number of ways to assign investments to firms,
there must be infinitely many equilibria.
Statement 3 of Proposition 1 clarifies this point further. It states that every equilib-
rium induces the same market portfolio of research projects — that is in every equilibrium
the set of developed projects will be the same and the number of firms investing in each
project will be the same. Thus, although there is a multiplicity of equilibria, the equilib-
rium market portfolio is unique. As firms are identical, welfare does not depend on the
identity of firms doing research. From the social welfare perspective, any two equilibria
are equivalent.
Furthermore, not only do all equilibria induce the same market portfolio of research
projects, but any investment that induces the equilibrium portfolio is itself an equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is straightforward — the profitability of any research project
depends only on the cost of the project and the number of competitors who are investing in
the same project. In particular, it does not depend on any other investment that the firm
or its competitors may be making. Hence, if in an equilibrium all profitable investments
are exhausted and no unprofitable investments are made, then any other investment plan
that prescribes the same investment portfolio in the same manner exhausts all profitable
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investments and has no superfluous investments.
Statement 3 of Proposition 1 implies that if I∗ is an equilibrium then the function
n(j, I∗) fully characterizes the equilibrium portfolio of research projects. As n(j, ·) is
the same for any equilibrium, we can denote the function characterizing the equilibrium
portfolio of research projects as n∗(j). Using the equilibrium constructed in the proof of
statement one of Proposition 1 and applying Assumption 2 yields the following result.
Proposition 2 (Characterization of equilibrium portfolio).
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Denote with m the maximum number of firms
investing in any project:
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
and with αk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which k firms can profitably
invest. That is:
R(1)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =0
R(2)− C(α2) =0
...
R(m)− C(αm) =0.
Let αm+1 = 0 and α0 = 1. Then the PSE portfolio n
∗(j) is given by
n∗(j) = k if j ∈ [αk+1, αk).
An illustration of the equilibrium market portfolio for N = 3 and a process innovation
in a Cournot market (which is the example from the appendix A.10) is provided in Figure
1. Here, m = 3 represents the maximum number of firms that can profitably invest in
any project. Because project 0 is by assumption the cheapest to develop, then m firms
will invest in this project. Each point αk is constructed so that, at the margin, if k firms
invested the profit from investment would be zero. As C(j) is assumed to be strictly
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Figure 1: Equilibrium market portfolio.
increasing, then at any point j > αk strictly fewer than k firms can profitably invest. As
rewards are finite and costs to innovation approach infinity as j → 1, values α1, α2, . . . , αm
always exist. Furthermore, as C(j) is increasing and by Assumption 1 the rewards to
innovation are non-increasing it is easy to see that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.8 From this
observation it follows directly that the function n∗(j) is weakly decreasing.
It is interesting to note that the present model would be equivalent to the level-of-
investment models if (i) the successful project was drawn for each firm separately and
(ii) the draws were independent. In such a setting, a firm would have no incentive to
choose more expensive R&D projects. Thus, in equilibrium, all firms would invest in
some interval of R&D projects [0, j), where investing in a marginal project increases the
probability of discovering the innovation at the marginal cost C(j). In such a setting
duplication of research and variety of research would be meaningless.
The set of all projects the market invests in is [0, α1). Thus, I will refer to α1 as the
variety of research projects undertaken. I will say that the variety of research projects
increases if α1 increases. The probability that the market develops an innovation is equal
to α1. Hence an increase in the variety of research projects implies an increase in the
8Note that the inequality is weak (because the inequality in Assumption 1 is weak), so that it might
happen for some k ≤ m that αk = αk+1. In this case, define [αk+1, αk) = ∅. Thus there will be no
project that exactly k firms will develop.
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probability that the market will develop an innovation. The function n∗(j) captures the
number of firms investing in any given project j in equilibrium. Hence, I will refer to the
number n∗(j) as the market amount of duplication of project j.
5 Comparative statics
In this section, I will study how the market portfolio of research projects changes as
the market structure changes. In particular, I will look at how a change in the number
of active firms in the market and the intensity of competition among them affects the
market portfolio of research projects. As can be seen from Proposition 2, the equilibrium
portfolio is characterized by the maximum number of firms m investing in any project
and the k-firm frontiers αk, for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. I will analyze how a change in N and a
change in the intensity of competition affect these variables.
Change in the number of firms
Consider first the case where the number of active firms in the market changes, but all
other characteristics of the market remain the same.
Proposition 3 (Increase in the number of firms).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Let the number of firms in the pre-innovation
market increase from N to N ′ so that the PSE investment plan changes from I to I ′.
1. In PSE, the variety of projects developed and the probability of developing an inno-
vation weakly increases, that is α1 ≤ α′1.
2. The maximum number of firms investing also increases, that is m ≤ m′.
3. Apart from the increase in variety of projects developed and in the maximum number
of firms investing, the PSE portfolio remains the same. That is, n(j, I) = n(j, I ′)
for all j ∈ [0, 1) \ {[0, α′m′ ] ∪ [α1, α′1]}.
If a firm innovates, it replaces its profits without the innovation with the profits with
the innovation. Thus, holding everything else equal, the larger the pre-innovation profits
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of firms, the weaker its incentive to innovate. The increase in the variety of developed
projects is driven solely by the Arrow replacement effect. In this setting, the firm investing
near α1 replaces r(0, N) with R(1). As r(0, N) ≥ r(0, N + 1), the Arrow replacement
effect is weaker when there are N + 1 firms in the market. Consequently, firms attempt
to escape the competition by investing in more expensive research projects than before
and the variety of developed projects increases. This is equivalent to saying that the
probability of discovering an innovation increases.
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Figure 2: Merger in a 3-firm Cournot market.
An increase in the number of active firms weakens the Arrow replacement effect both
in this model and in the usual level-of-investment models. A difference, however, arises
in the effect on the ex post profits of firms. Here the firms are free to choose in which
projects to invest. The number of firms investing in any given project, and hence the
ex post number of competitors, is endogenously determined. Following Vives (2008),
call the reduction in innovation incentives due to competition ex post as the Schumpeter
effect. Then, the Schumpeter effect in this model does not change as the number of ex
ante active firms changes (except in those cases where the number of firms ex post was
limited by the number of active firms). This leads to the clear effect of an increase in the
number of firms on the variety of projects developed, as only one firm will invest in the
most expensive projects.
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Consider in this context the invariance result of Sah and Stiglitz (1987), which states
that the number of research projects is invariant to the number of firms in the market. The
invariance can only hold if r(0, N) = r(0, N + 1), that is, only if the Arrow replacement
effect is constant. Clearly this will hold under homogeneous goods Bertrand competition
as Sah and Stiglitz (1987) have originally assumed, because r(0, N) = 0 for any N ≥ 2.
Conversely, it will not hold (in general) under Cournot competition as r(0, N) will be
decreasing in N , which is in line with the results derived in Reynolds and Isaac (1992)
and Farrell, Gilbert, and Katz (2003).
Merger analysis
One implication of this result is that a merger in an imperfectly competitive industry
will potentially lead to a loss of variety of approaches to innovation (see Figure 2). Thus,
competition authorities should take this loss of variety of approaches to innovation into
account when reviewing merger cases, especially if innovation is important in the industry,
as it was in the proposed Lockheed-Northrop merger.9 As the loss of the variety of
approaches to innovation is driven by the Arrow replacement effect, the magnitude of the
loss of variety will be proportional to the increase in profits (in the market without the
innovation) due to the merger.
This result depends on the assumption that the merger merely reduces the number
of active firms in the industry, without changing the production or the innovation cost
functions of the merged firms.10 However, if the merged firm is more efficient than the
individual firms, then this efficiency gain can outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the
merger. As a matter of fact, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission (2010) Horizontal Merger Guidelines explicitly recognize this efficiency defense
when analyzing the effects of mergers on innovation.11
The result in Proposition 3 shows that a merger can lead to a decrease in the variety of
approaches to innovation. Two extensions I develop in the Online Appendix (Section B.1)
9For details see Robinson (1999) and Rubinfeld and Hoven (2001).
10I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point.
11“When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the ability of the
merged firm to conduct research or development more effectively.” See Section 10 of the Guidelines.
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show how this result can be overturned if the merger in question leads to efficiency gains.
The first extension (Proposition 7) supposes that the merged firm can invest in innovation
at a lower cost than its competitors. Importantly, the efficiency is not dependent on the
identity of the merging firms. Proposition 7 shows that, for a general specification of cost
efficiencies, a pure strategy equilibrium exists, the variety of approaches developed in
equilibrium is uniquely determined and the variety does not decrease in the post-merger
market if the efficiency is large enough. The second extension (Proposition 8) considers
an alternative form of efficiency gains. There, the efficiencies depend on the identities
of merging firms, so that each merger reduces the cost of innovation in a merger-specific
interval of approaches to innovation. Proposition 8 shows that also in this setting a
pure strategy equilibrium exists and the variety of approaches developed in equilibrium
is uniquely determined. However, in this case it is not sufficient for the efficiency gains
to be large enough. In order for such a merger to not decrease the variety of approaches
to innovation, the merger has to be of the right kind — namely, the efficiency gains
must affect those approaches to innovation which would not have been developed in the
absence of the efficiency gains.
These results suggest that a merger in a highly innovative but imperfectly competitive
industry might lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches to innovation, as has been
suggested in the Lockheed-Northrop case. Thus, the competition authorities should take
this potential effect into account when reviewing merger applications. At the same time,
if a merger would lead to efficiency gains which are large enough and of the right kind,
the merger need not decrease variety and could even lead to an increase in the variety
of approaches to innovation. Thus, an efficiency defense should be considered also in the
case where the effect of the merger on variety of approaches to innovation is a cause for
concern.
Change in the intensity of competition
The competitive structure of the market is not only determined by the number of firms
which are active in the market, but also by the intensity of competition among firms.
Suppose that there are two sets of reward functions {R, r} and {R′, r′} such that R(n) >
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R′(n) for every n > 1, R(1) = R′(1) and r(0, N) > r′(0, N). Then we can interpret the
move from {R, r} to {R′, r′} as an increase in the intensity of competition. Most standard
examples of an increase in the intensity of competition correspond to this definition.
In particular, in the appendix A.10 I will consider a move from Cournot to Bertrand
type of competition, but models of differentiated Cournot/Bertrand also correspond to
this definition. The next result considers the effect of an increase in the intensity of
competition on the market R&D portfolio.
Proposition 4 (Increase in the intensity of competition).
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let N ≥ 2 and suppose the intensity of compe-
tition increases so that the PSE investment plan changes from I to I ′. Then the variety
of research projects undertaken and the probability of discovering the innovation increase.
That is α1 < α
′
1. The amount of duplication of research decreases. That is for each j
such that n(j, I) ≥ 2 we have n(j, I) ≥ n(j, I ′) with n(j, I) > n(j, I ′) for at least some
projects.
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Figure 3: An illustration of an increase in intensity of competition.
An increase in the intensity of competition decreases the profits firms receive if no
firm successfully innovates, thereby weakening the Arrow replacement effect and leading
to an increase in the variety of developed research projects. On the other hand, it also
decreases payoffs to firms if there are multiple innovators, leading to a (weakly) decreasing
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number of firms investing in duplicative research projects. An increase in the intensity
of competition “flattens out” the equilibrium research portfolio, reducing the duplication
of costs (see Figure 3). However, it is not clear that an increase in the intensity of
competition will lead to higher social welfare. On the one hand, duplication of costs is
reduced and the variety of research projects is increased. On the other, less duplication
of costs also implies fewer firms (though competing more vigorously!) in the product
market leading to a possible efficiency loss. Which effect prevails will depend on the
exact specification of the product market competition and the demand function.
An increase in the number of firms is sometimes used as a way to model an increase
in the intensity of competition. The preceding results highlight the difference between
an increase in the number of firms and an increase in the intensity of competition as
defined here. An increase in the intensity of competition reduces firm profits whenever
there are multiple firms competing. That is, it reduces firm profits both ex ante and
ex post. The number of firms, due to the endogeneity of the ex post market structure,
affects firm profits only ex ante. Thus, the Schumpeter effect is present only in the case
of an increase in the intensity of competition and not in the case of an increase in the
number of firms.
6 Optimal portfolio
There are several reasons to suspect that a market R&D portfolio will not be optimal.
When the innovator cannot appropriate the entire surplus because a part of the surplus
is captured by the consumers, the incentive to innovate may be too low. On the other
hand, if innovation enables firms to become more competitive in the market and steal
business from their competitors, the incentive to innovate may be too high.12 However, as
this article argues, looking solely at the levels of investment in innovation is misleading.
Rather, the question to be posed is whether the market invests in the optimal variety of
projects and whether it optimally duplicates projects. That is, the question is how the
market R&D portfolio compares to the socially optimal portfolio.
12For an example of the under- and over-investment in innovation due to the two effects outlined here
see Bester and Petrakis (1993).
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The approach here is to ask what is the R&D portfolio that maximizes the expected
social welfare. That is, the social planner can determine the R&D portfolio, but given
the portfolio the firms will be profit maximizing. In particular, firms do not share the
results of research, so some duplication of research will be optimal, as duplication of the
successful project implies higher product market efficiency ex post.
Recall that W (n) denotes the social welfare generated by the product market if there
are n firms with the new technology, for every n ≤ N . That is, W (0) is welfare if no firm
has successfully innovated and W (N) is welfare if all firms have the new technology. The
welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, that is W (n) = CS(n) +
nR(n,N) + (N − n)r(n,N).
Analogously to Proposition 2, the optimal portfolio is characterized:
Proposition 5 (Characterization of the optimal portfolio).
Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Denote with mo the optimal number of firms developing
the least expensive project:
mo = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. W (n)−W (n− 1)− C(0) > 0
and with αok for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which at most k firms
can optimally invest. That is:
W (1)−W (0)− C(αo1) =
W (2)−W (1)− C(αo2) =
...
W (mo)−W (mo − 1)− C(αom) = 0.
Let α0m+1 = 0 and α
o
0 = 1. Then the optimal portfolio n
o(j) is given by
no(j) = k if j ∈ [αok+1, αok).
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Market investment in variety
It is now possible to directly compare the market R&D portfolio with the optimal port-
folio. In this way it is possible to identify if and how the market portfolio differs from the
optimum and to suggest a way in which a policy intervention can improve the market
outcome.
The net externality from investing in marginal variety (a research project that is not
developed by any other firm) is given by:
σ = −(N − 1)r(0, N) + [CS(1)− CS(0)] .
The first expression captures the negative externality imposed on the competitors of the
firms making the marginal investment. They lose the profits they would obtain if no firm
invested in the marginal project and the marginal project turned out to be successful.
The second expression captures the positive externality imposed on the customers — who
receive the surplus associated with one firm innovating as opposed to the surplus asso-
ciated without innovation. Corollary 1 states that the optimality of investment variety
depends on the sign of the net externality imposed by the marginal variety.
Corollary 1 (Market investment in variety).
Suppose that assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Then the market will underinvest in the variety
of R&D projects if and only if σ > 0. The market will invest in the optimal variety of
R&D projects if and only if σ = 0. The market will overinvest in the variety of R&D
projects if and only if σ < 0.
In principle the sign of σ should be checked for each model. However, as will be shown
later, in a large class of homogeneous goods models the assumption that the innovation
is drastic implies that CS(1) ≥ W (0) ≥ CS(0) + (N − 1)r(0, N). Thus, the market
will in this case underinvest in the variety of R&D projects. The intuition for this is as
follows. A process innovation is drastic if the monopolist’s price is below the marginal
cost of production without the innovation. Hence, consumer surplus with a monopolist
(i.e., CS(1)), which is equal to the difference between the reservation price and the price
paid, is greater than total welfare without the innovation (i.e., W (0)), which is equal to
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the difference between the reservation price and the cost of production.
To illustrate the market underinvestment in variety, consider a simple homogeneous
product market similar to the one analyzed in Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Suppose
that the inverse market demand function is given by P (Q), where Q is the aggregate
output in the market and P ′(Q) < 0 for all Q. There are N symmetric firms, each of
which possesses a technology given by the cost function c¯(q), where c¯(0) = 0, c¯′(·) ≥ 0 for
all q ≥ 0. Firms can invest in R&D to develop a drastic process innovation, in which case
their technology is given by the cost function c(q), where c(0) = 0, c′(·) ≥ 0 for all q ≥ 0.
A process innovation is drastic if a monopolist facing the cost function c(q) chooses a
price which is below the marginal cost of production of a firm with the old technology.
Formally, an innovating monopolist would choose a quantity q1 such that P (q1) < c¯
′(0).
Proposition 6 (Underinvestment in homogeneous product markets).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Then an industry a` la Mankiw and Whinston
with a potential drastic process innovation always underinvests in the variety of R&D
projects.
As the case of homogeneous product market illustrates, a decentralized market will
tend to underinvest in drastic innovations. It should be noted that the critical assumption
in this example is not the type of the product market competition. Rather, it is the
assumption that the innovation is drastic which drives the result.
Proposition 6 offers insights relevant to research policy. Suppose that society cannot
affect the market structure or the behavior of firms in the market but can offer subsidies
for research. The market will tend to underinvest in the variety of drastic innovation
by failing to develop high-cost projects which should optimally be developed. Thus, the
research subsidies should be directed toward research projects with (1) high costs; and
(2) and high potential payoffs.
Market investment in duplication
Typically, the market R&D portfolio will involve some duplication of research projects.
As this is duplication of identical projects, it does not increase the probability that an
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innovation will be discovered. However, duplication is not entirely wasteful either. If
multiple firms develop the same project and this project turns out to be the successful
one, then there will be more competitors on the product market. So for the cost of
duplicating research the society receives the (weakly) higher product market efficiency.
The efficient duplication of R&D projects is captured by the optimal portfolio.
In equilibrium, a firm duplicating a research project imposes both negative external-
ities on its competitors (in the form of business stealing effect) and positive externalities
on the consumers (in the form of the efficiency effect). Define the net externalities effect
of the k-th duplication as:
δ(k) =
[
(k − 1)(R(k)−R(k − 1))]+ [CS(k)− CS(k − 1)].
The first bracket captures the negative externalities generated by the investment of the
k-th innovator, which are the reduction of profits of k − 1 firms from R(k − 1) to R(k).
The second bracket captures the positive externalities which accrue to the consumers,
and which are captured by the difference between CS(k) and CS(k − 1), the consumer
surplus when there are k competitors and k − 1 competitors on the product market,
respectively.
Corollary 2 (Market investment in duplication).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Denote with m the maximum number of firms
investing in the market equilibrium and with mo the maximal number of firms investing
in the optimal equilibrium. For 2 ≤ k ≤ min{m,mo} , denote with αk the k-firm frontiers
in the market portfolio and with αok the k-firm frontiers in the optimal portfolio.
If δ(k) < 0 then αok < αk and the market overinvests in duplication of all projects
j ∈ (αok, αk). If δ(k) > 0 then αk < αok and the market underinvests in duplication of
all projects j ∈ (αk, αok). If δ(k) = 0 then αok = αk and the market optimally invests in
duplication of all projects in the neighborhood of αk.
If m ≥ mo and δ(k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,mo}, then the market (weakly) overinvests
in duplication of all R&D projects. Conversely, if m ≤ mo and δ(k) ≤ 0 for all k ∈
{2, . . . ,m}, then the market (weakly) underinvests in duplication of all R&D projects.
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If the net externalities are negative (δ(k) < 0), then it would be optimal to reduce
the equilibrium number of firms investing in projects (αok, αk) from k to k − 1. If the
externalities are positive then the number of firms should be increased in the interval
(αk, α
o
k).
From the perspective of a fixed project j, the question of whether the amount of
duplication is optimal or not is essentially equivalent to the question whether the free
entry in an industry with fixed costs is optimal or not. Here, the question is of an entry
in a ‘potential’ industry, fixed costs are the cost of developing this specific project C(j),
and the number of firms that can enter is limited by the number of firms which are active
in the pre-innovation market. Keeping in mind the upper bound on the number of firms
imposed by N , the results derived in Mankiw and Whinston (1986) apply in this setting as
well. For the homogeneous product market and ignoring the integer constraint, Mankiw
and Whinston find that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms is not less than the
socially optimal number of firms (i.e., there is no underinvestment in duplication in our
terminology), and furthermore if the equilibrium price is above the marginal costs, then
the equilibrium number of firms is strictly greater than the optimal number (i.e. there
is overinvestment in duplication).13 That is, Mankiw and Whinston identify conditions
under which an industry equilibrium would tend toward excessive entry. In the context
of the present model, this implies that there should be a tendency toward overinvestment
in duplication of R&D projects. Taking into account the integer constraint weakens
this result somewhat — Mankiw and Whinston establish that the free-entry equilibrium
number of firms is not lower than the optimal number of firms less one.14 In the notation
of this article, that would be n∗(j) ≥ no(j) − 1 for appropriate project j. This suggests
that even though there might be underinvestment in the duplication of R&D projects, it
will be bounded from below.
13Proposition 1 in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
14Proposition 2 in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
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Figure 4: Optimal and market portfolios of research projects.
7 Extensions and robustness
This section relaxes several assumptions made in the model. For simplicity, in all following
subsections except the first one, I will assume that there are only two firms in the market.
Non-drastic innovations
The assumption that innovation is drastic significantly simplifies the analysis, as it allows
us to ignore all firms which have failed to innovate whenever at least one firm has inno-
vated. However, there are many innovations which are incremental and which give only
a slight advantage to the innovating firm over its rivals. This section relaxes Assumption
2 and provides a more general characterization of the market equilibrium portfolio.
First observe that Proposition 1 does not rely on Assumption 2. Hence, an equilibrium
of the investment game exists and except in trivial cases an infinite number of equilibria
exists. However, the equilibrium market portfolio is unique and any investment plan that
generates the equilibrium market portfolio is itself an equilibrium of the investment game.
The next result characterizes the equilibrium market portfolio without Assumption 2.
Proposition 2a (Characterization of equilibrium portfolio).
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Denote with m the maximum number of firms investing
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in any project:
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
and with αk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which k firms can profitably
invest. That is:
R(1, N)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =
R(2, N)− r(1, N)− C(α2) =
...
R(m,N)− r(m− 1, N)− C(αm) = 0.
Let αm+1 = 0 and α0 = 1. Then the PSE portfolio n
∗(j) is given by
n∗(j) = k if j ∈ [αk+1, αk).
The basic form of the equilibrium portfolio is the same as in the case with the drastic
innovation — it is still a step function with a declining number of firms investing as
projects become more expensive. There are two differences however. First, the payoffs
with the innovation R(·, N) are now functions of N , because the firms without the in-
novation can put competitive pressure on the firms with the innovation. Second, firms
without the innovation can now obtain positive profits, which decreases the incentive to
duplicate research.
As a consequence, the comparative statics results become ambiguous if Assumption 2
does not hold. Consider a merger, so that the number of firms in the industry is reduced
from N to N − 1. If Assumption 2 holds, then Proposition 3 holds and the merger leads
to a decrease in the variety of projects undertaken. If Assumption 2 does not hold, the
variety of projects undertaken will (weakly) decrease if and only if
r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N) ≥ R(1, N − 1)−R(1, N),
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or, in words, only if the merger increases profits without the innovation more than it does
for the single innovator. An analogous condition is required for any other n-firm frontier
as well as for the changes in the intensity of competition among firms.
Figure 5 illustrates the Cournot duopoly example from the appendix A.10 with drastic
and with non-drastic innovation and shows that the essential structure of the model does
not depend on Assumption 2.
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Figure 5: Drastic versus non-drastic innovation.
Asymmetric firms
Suppose that two firms are producing homogeneous goods with different technologies,
so that one firm has lower marginal costs of production than the other. Call the more
efficient firm the leader and denote its marginal production cost with c¯lead. Call the less
efficient firm the laggard and denote its marginal production cost with c¯lag. Suppose
that the firms are symmetric in all other aspects and furthermore suppose that firms
can invest in the development of a new production technology which would lower the
production costs of whichever firm develops it to c, such that c¯lag > c¯lead > c. Suppose
that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
First observe that if neither firm develops the innovation, firms will continue com-
peting with the old technology and the leader’s profits rlead(0, 2) will be greater than
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the laggard’s profits rlag(0, 2). However, as the innovation is drastic, the profits post-
innovation will be the same for both firms Rlead(1) = Rlag(1) and Rlead(2) = Rlag(2).
To simplify exposition, assume C(0) < R(2). Analogously to before, denote the k-firm
frontiers as
α1,lag = C
−1(R(1)− rlag(0, 2)),
α1,lead = C
−1(R(1)− rlead(0, 2)),
α2 = C
−1(R(2)),
where α1,lag is the most expensive project in which the laggard would invest and α1,lead
is the most expensive project in which the leader would invest. It is straightforward to
see that α2 ≤ α1,lead < α1,lag. In equilibrium, both firms will invest in the interval [0, α2),
for any project in the interval [α2, α1,lead) either the leader or the laggard will invest (but
only one will), and only the laggard will invest in the interval [α1,lead, α1,lag), whereas
no firm will invest in the interval [α1,lag, 1). Hence this model predicts that the laggard
firms will be more likely to invest in the most expensive projects. Furthermore, if one is
willing to assume that where both firms can invest they do so symmetrically, the laggard
will be more likely to develop drastic innovations. This prediction is consistent with the
results in Akcigit and Kerr (2010), who find that smaller firms tend to have higher R&D
expenses per employee and more patents per employee than larger firms.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio of research projects, using the
Cournot duopoly from the appendix A.10.
Innovations as strategic complements
Consider a case with two firms in the industry and relax Assumption 1. Assumption 1
will not hold if innovations are sufficiently strong complements, for example in the case
of research spillovers. If Assumption 1 does not hold then it must be true that:
R(2, 2)− r(1, 2) > R(1, 2)− r(0, 2).
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Figure 6: Asymmetric firms.
Assumption 2 is immaterial for the following discussion and it is not assumed to hold.
Analogous to the use of k-firm frontiers before, let:
α1 = C
−1(R(1, 2)− r(0, 2)),
α2 = C
−1(R(2, 2)− r(1, 2)),
where C−1(·) is the inverse of the function C(·). As C(·) is a strictly increasing function,
we have α2 > α1. This introduces ambiguity in the number of firms that will, in equilib-
rium, invest in the interval [α1, α2). A single firm cannot profitably invest in any project
in this interval, but two firms can. Hence, in equilibrium, it must hold that in any project
in this interval, either no firm invests or both do. In the interval [0, α1) both firms will
invest, whereas in the interval [α2, 1) neither firm will invest. If Assumption 1 does not
hold, there will be an infinity of equilibrium market portfolios. In this sense, Assump-
tion 1 is essential for the model. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio of
research projects.
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Figure 7: Violating Assumption 1.
8 Conclusion
This article studies how the market structure, that is the number of firms competing on
the market and the nature of competition among them, influences the choice of research
projects undertaken. The main object of analysis is the R&D portfolio, an object that
captures both the variety of research projects undertaken, as well as the amount of
duplicative research.
It is shown that, even though the effect of an increase in competition on the total
level of investment in innovation is ambiguous, the increase in competition increases the
variety of approaches to innovation and increases the probability that an innovation is
discovered. The policy recommendation drawn from this conclusion is that competition
authorities should take into account this negative effect on the investment in innovation
when reviewing merger cases.
Comparing the equilibrium market portfolio with the optimal equilibrium portfolio, it
is shown that the market will tend to underinvest in drastic innovation. This underinvest-
ment will be more severe the higher the potential benefit from innovation and the lower
the overall intensity of competition in the industry. This suggests that R&D subsidies
should be targeted at high cost and high potential benefit projects (so-called blue sky
projects) — especially in the industries with few firms and low intensity of competition.
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This article presents an innovation model where firms choose R&D projects in which
to invest. In this model, the variety of approaches to innovation as well as the duplica-
tion of R&D projects can be explicitly analyzed. This opens up at least two avenues for
future research. First, a choice-of-R&D-projects model could be embedded into a growth
framework, which could be used to analyze how different market structure and govern-
ment policies could influence variety and duplication of R&D projects and through it
long-term economic growth. Second, as eloquently argued in Segal and Whinston (2007),
competition policy needs to focus more on the long-term effects such policy has on in-
novation in any given industry. The present model could be extended into a dynamic
framework, so that questions of variety and duplication of R&D projects could be ana-
lyzed in a dynamic setting.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition 1 in turn.
Lemma 1 (Existence). An equilibrium in pure actions always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma 1 in three steps. Step 1 constructs the
candidate equilibrium investment plan I∗. Step 2 proves that no firm can increase its
expected profits by making additional investments. Step 3 proves that no firm can increase
its expected profits by reducing investments. Finally, notice that any deviation from the
investment plan I∗ can be written as a collection of investments and divestments and by
Steps 2 and 3, each such investment and divestment decreases expected profits and hence
any such collection must decrease expected profits. Thus, no firm can profitably deviate
from the investment plan I∗ and then, by definition, I∗ is an equilibrium.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
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s.t. R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1, N)− r(0, N)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem
always exists.
Next, calculate each α1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1, N)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =
R(2, N)− r(1, N)− C(α2) =
R(3, N)− r(2, N)− C(α3) =
...
R(m,N)− r(m− 1, N)− C(αm) = 0.
By construction it holds R(m,N) − r(m − 1, N) − C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1
the reward of innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As
costs of innovation approach infinity as j → 1, values α1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by
the Intermediate Value Theorem. Furthermore, as C(j) is increasing and by applying
Assumption 1 it is easy to see that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.
Observe that N ≥ m. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let I∗i = [0, αi). For each i ∈
{m+ 1, . . . , N} let I∗i = ∅. I will demonstrate that I∗ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I∗ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
profits by making additional investments.
Proof. First observe that as ∀j ∈ (α1, 1), by construction R(1, N)−r(0, N)−C(j) < 0, no
firm has an incentive to invest beyond the technology frontier. I will consider separately
the firms which in I∗ have some investment and those firms which do not.
First, fix a firm i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and take any feasible investment interval L ⊆ [αi′ , α1).
It must be that min(L) ∈ [αk, αk−1)15 for some k ≤ i′ and k ≥ 2 and sup(L) ∈ (αk′ , αk′−1]
for some k′ ≤ i′ and k′ ≥ 2, with k′ ≤ k.
First consider the case where k′ = k. Then L ⊆ [αk, αk−1). Observe that R(k,N) −
r(k − 1, N) − C(αk) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ [αk, αk−1) by construction. As
15If αk = αk−1, let L = {αk} and min(L) = αk.
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C(·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, then R(k,N) − r(k − 1, N) − C(j) < 0 for all
j ∈ (min(L), sup(L)). Hence,
−
∫
L
C(j)dj +
∫
L
R(k,N)dj −
∫
L
r(k − 1, N)dj < 0
and the firm i′ has no incentive to invest in the interval L.
Next consider the case where k′ < k. Then we can write L = [min(L), αk−1) ∪
[αk−1, αk−2) ∪ · · · ∪ [αk′ , sup(L)). Denote these subintervals as Lk−1, Lk−2, . . . , Lk′−1.
Observe that by construction, the following statements hold:
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(αk) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(αk−1) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 2 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(αk′) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k′ − 1 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
As C(·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, the following statements hold:
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
But then it holds
∫
L
R(n(j, I∗) + 1, N)− r(n(j, I∗), N)− C(j)dj =
=
(∫
Lk−1
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(j)dj
)
+
(∫
Lk−2
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj
)
+
· · ·+
(∫
Lk′−1
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(j)dj
)
< 0
and the firm i′ has no incentive to invest in the interval L.
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Next, fix a firm i′ ∈ {m + 1, . . . , N} and take any feasible investment interval L ⊆
[0, α1). Observe that we can write L as a union of two sets, L = L
′∪L′′ where L′ ⊆ [0, αm)
and L′′ ⊆ [αm, α1). By the same argument as above, it holds that any investment in the
set L′′ cannot be profitable. Consider now an investment in the set L′. By construction,
m is the maximum number of firms that can profitably invest in the project j = 0. As
C(j) is strictly increasing it is also the maximum number of firms that can invest in any
project. By construction, there are m firms investing in all projects in [0, αm) and as a
result the firm i′ cannot profitably invest in the set L′. Thus, the investment in the set
L cannot be profitable.
Step 3. Suppose that I∗ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
profits by decreasing investments.
Proof. First observe that all firms i > m have zero investments by construction and
hence cannot decrease their investments. Fix a firm i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and take any feasible
investment interval L ⊆ [0, αi′). Consider a disinvestment from the set L. It must be
that min(L) ∈ [αk, αk−1) for some k − 1 ≥ i′ with k ≤ m + 1 and αm+1 = 0 and
sup(L) ∈ (αk′ , αk′−1] for some k′ − 1 ≥ i′ and k′ ≤ k.
Consider the case where k′ = k. Then L ⊆ [αk, αk−1). Observe that R(k − 1, N) −
r(k− 2, N)−C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k− 1 for all j ∈ (αk, αk−1) by construction. Hence,
∫
L
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj > 0.
and the firm i′ has no incentive to divest from the interval L.
Next consider the case where k′ < k. Then we can write L = [min(L), αk−1) ∪
[αk−1, αk−2) ∪ · · · ∪ [αk′ , sup(L)). Denote these subintervals as Lk−1, Lk−2, . . . , Lk′−1.
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Observe that by construction, the following statements hold:
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 2, N)− r(k − 3, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 2 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′ − 1, N)− r(k′ − 2, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k′ − 1 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
But then it holds
∫
L′′
R(n(j, I∗), N)− r(n(j, I∗)− 1, N)− C(j)dj =
=
∫
Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj +
∫
Lk−2
R(k − 2, N)− r(k − 3, N)−C(j)dj+
+ · · ·+
∫
Lk′−1
R(k′ − 1, N)− r(k′ − 2, N)−C(j)dj > 0
and the firm i′ has no incentive to divest from the interval L.
Thus no firm can increase its expected profits by divesting from any feasible interval
L.
Lemma 2. If I∗ is an equilibrium and 0 < n(j, I∗) < N for some j ∈ [0, 1), then infinitely
many equilibria exist.
Proof. Let I∗ be an equilibrium and fix some j ∈ [0, 1) such that 0 < n(j, I∗) < N . Then
there exist firms i and i′ such that j ∈ Ii and j 6∈ Ii′ . Then there must exist some  > 0
such that [j, j + ) ∩ Ii = [j, j + ) and [j, j + ) ∩ Ii′ = ∅.
Consider an investment plan Iˆ such that Iˆi′′ = I
∗
i′′ , for all i
′′ 6= i, i′. For i and i′ let
Iˆi = I
∗
i \ [j, j + ) and Iˆi′ = I∗i′ ∪ [j, j + ). In words, only transfer the ownership of
investment in projects [j, j+) from firm i to firm i′ and leave everything else unchanged.
I will demonstrate that Iˆ is also an equilibrium and hence, because there is an infinite
number of ways to choose , there exists an infinity of equilibria.
Suppose that Iˆ is not an equilibrium. Then, there exists a firm that can profitably
change its investment plan. This means that there exists an interval L ⊂ [0, 1) and a
37
firm il such that firm can increase its expected profits by either investing in the interval
L or divesting from the interval L. Consider first those firms i′′ 6= i, i′. By construction
n(j, I∗) = n(j, Iˆ) for all j ∈ [0, 1). From Equation 1, it is clear that strategic effects only
influence the expected profit through n(j, I). Thus, if a firm can profitably deviate from
Iˆ it can also profitably deviate from I∗.
Next, consider firms i and i′. As their investment plans are unchanged in the set
[0, j) ∪ [j + , 1) by an argument identical to the one above, if they could profitably
deviate in this set from Iˆ, they could also profitably deviate from I∗. Now consider the
set [j, j + ). Firm i′ can deviate in this set only by not investing. Suppose that there
exists an interval L′ ⊆ [j, j+ ), such that not investing in this set increases the expected
profits of firm i′. Then it must be the case that
∫
L′
R(n(j, Iˆ), N)− r(n(j, Iˆ)− 1, N)− C(j)dj < 0.
But in this case, firm i could profitably deviate from I∗ by not investing in the interval
L′. Next, firm i can deviate in the set [j, j + ) only by investing. Suppose that there
exists an interval L′ ⊆ [j, j + ), such that investing in this set increases the expected
profits of firm i. Then it must be the case that
∫
L′
R(n(j, Iˆ) + 1, N)− r(n(j, Iˆ), N)− C(j)dj > 0.
But in this case, firm i′ could profitably deviate from I∗ by investing in the interval L′.
Thus, in each case, a profitable deviation from Iˆ implies a profitable deviation from
I∗ which contradicts the initial assumption that I∗ is an equilibrium.
Lemma 3. If there are multiple equilibria they all result in the same market portfolio of
investment in innovation. That is, if I∗1 and I
∗
2 are equilibrium investment plans, then
n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I
∗
2 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1). If I∗1 is an equilibrium then any investment plan I∗3
such that n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I
∗
3 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1) is also an equilibrium.
I prove this Lemma in two steps, each proving one part of the Lemma.
Step 1. If there are multiple equilibria they all result in the same market portfolio of
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investment in innovation. That is, if I∗1 and I
∗
2 are equilibrium investment plans, then
n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I
∗
2 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a point j ∈ [0, 1) such that n(j, I∗1 ) 6= n(j, I∗2 ).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that n(j, I∗1 ) > n(j, I
∗
2 ). Fix a firm i and a point
 > 0 such that it holds [j, j + ) ∩ I∗1,i = [j, j + ) and [j, j + ) ∩ I∗2,i = ∅ and n(l, I∗1 ) =
const , n(l, I∗2 ) = const,∀l ∈ [j, j + ). Such a firm and a point always exist.
(1) Suppose R(n(j, I∗1 ), N) − r(n(j, I∗1 ) − 1, N) ≥ C(j + ). As C(·) is increasing it
holds R(n(j, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗1 )− 1, N) > C(l) for all l ∈ [j, j + ). By Assumption 1 it
holds R(n(j, I∗2 ) + 1, N)− r(n(j, I∗2 ), N) > C(l) for all l ∈ [j, j + ). Then it holds
∫ j+
j
R(n(l, I∗2 ) + 1, N)− r(n(l, I∗2 ), N)− C(l)dl > 0.
Then I∗2 cannot be an equilibrium as firm i could increase its expected profits by investing
in the interval [j, j + ).
(2) Suppose R(n(j, I∗1 ), N)−r(n(j, I∗1 )−1, N) < C(j+ ). Then there exists an ′ > 0
such that R(n(j, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗1 )− 1, N) < C(l) for all l ∈ [j + − ′, j + ). Then it
holds ∫ j+
j+−′
R(n(l, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(l, I∗1 )− 1, N)− C(l)dl < 0.
Then I∗1 cannot be an equilibrium as firm i could increase its expected profits by not
investing in the interval [j + − ′, j + ).
Step 2. If I∗1 is an equilibrium then any investment plan I
∗
3 such that n(j, I
∗
1 ) = n(j, I
∗
3 )
for all j ∈ [0, 1) is also an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. Then in the investment plan I∗3 exists a firm i and an interval L
such that firm i would be better off by either investing in the interval L or by divesting
from interval L.
(1) Suppose that the firm i can profitably invest in the interval L. Then there exists
L′ ⊆ L such that R(n(j, I∗3 ) + 1) − r(n(j, I∗3 ), N) > C(l) for all l ∈ L′. But then there
exists a firm i′′ and a set L′′ ⊆ L′ such that L′′ ∩ I∗1,i′′ = ∅. Then I∗1 cannot be an
equilibrium as the firm i′′ could profitably deviate by investing in the interval L′′.
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(2) Suppose that the firm i can profitably divest from the interval L. Then there
exists L′ ⊆ L such that R(n(j, I∗3 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗3 − 1), N) < C(l) for all l ∈ L′. But then
there exists a firm i′′ and a set L′′ ⊆ L′ such that L′′ ∩ I∗1,i′′ = L′′. Then I∗1 cannot be an
equilibrium as the firm i′′ could profitably deviate by divesting from the interval L′′.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Observe that by Assumption 2, for all n ≥ 1 we have r(n,N) = 0. Let I∗ be the
equilibrium constructed in the proof of Lemma 1. If n∗(j) as constructed in Proposition 2
is equal to n(j, I∗) for all j ∈ [0, 1), then by statement 3 in Proposition 1 it characterizes
the equilibrium market portfolio of research projects.
I here show that n∗(j) = n(j, I∗). First, as noted in the proof of Lemma 1, observe
that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. First suppose that j ∈ [α1, 1) Then it must be that j ≥ αk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence n∗(j) = 0. By construction, n(l, I∗) = 0 for all l ∈ [α1, 1).
Next, suppose that j ∈ [0, α1). Then
n∗(j) = max
1,...,m
k
s.t. j < αk
Let kˆ = n∗(j). It holds that j < αkˆ ≤ αkˆ−1 ≤ · · · ≤ α1. By construction, each firm i
such that i ∈ {1, . . . , kˆ} invests in j. Hence, n(j, I∗) = kˆ.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
I will prove each statement in the proposition in turn. Let the number of firms in the
pre-innovation market increase from N to N ′. Denote the maximum number of firms
investing in two cases as m and m′ and the k-firm frontiers as αk and α′k.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, the variety of projects developed and the probability of devel-
oping an innovation weakly increases, that is α1 ≤ α′1.
Proof. By Proposition 2 the variety of projects developed in the two equilibria is equal
to the sets [0, α1) and [0, α
′
1) and the probability of successfully developing an innovation
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is equal to α1 and α
′
1. Thus we need to show that α1 ≤ α′1. By Proposition 2 we
have R(1) − r(0, N) = C(α1) and R(1) − r(0, N ′) = C(α′1). By assumption 3 we have
r(n − 1, N ′) ≤ r(n − 1, N) hence C(α′1) ≥ C(α1). As C(j) is assumed to be increasing
this implies α′1 ≥ α1.
Lemma 5. The maximum number of firms investing also increases, that is m ≤ m′.
Proof. By Proposition 2 we have m = max
{1,...,N}
n such that R(n) − r(n − 1, N) − C(0) >
0. Observe that m ∈ {1, . . . , N} ⊆ {1, . . . , N ′}. If n = 1, by assumption 3 we have
R(n)− r(n− 1, N ′)− C(0) ≥ R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0). If n > 1, by assumption 2 we
have R(n)− r(n− 1, N ′)− C(0) = R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0). Hence m is chosen from
a subset from which m′ is chosen and it satisfies a stricter condition. Thus m′ cannot be
lower than m.
Lemma 6. Apart from the increase in variety of projects developed and in the maximum
number of firms investing, the equilibrium portfolio remains the same. That is, n(j, I) =
n(j, I ′) for all j ∈ [0, 1) \ {[0, α′m′ ] ∪ [α1, α′1]}.
Proof. Because α′1 ≥ α1, we have n(j, I) = n(j, I ′) = 0 for all j ∈ [α′1, 1). As R(k) does
not depend on N or N ′, by Proposition 2 it follows that αk = α′k for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
Again by Proposition 2 it follows that n(j, I) = n(j, I ′) for all j ∈ (α′m′ , α1).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose the intensity of competition increases from (R, r) to (R′, r′). Denote the
respective equilibrium investment plans as I and I ′. Then the following holds by direct
application of Proposition 2:
m′

= m if R′(m,N)− C(0) > 0
< m otherwise
α′k < αk ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,m′}
α′1 > α1
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and
n(j, I ′) ≤ n(j, I) for all j ∈ [0, α1)
n(j, I ′) > n(j, I) for all j ∈ [α1, α′1)
n(j, I ′) = n(j, I) = 0 for all j ∈ [α′1, 1).
Because α′1 > α1 the variety of research projects undertaken and the probability of
discovering an innovation increase. Because α′k < αk ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,m′} there are some
projects which are developed by fewer firms than with less intense competition. Hence
the amount of duplication of research decreases.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The portfolio given in Proposition 5 can always be constructed. I show that it is
optimal. Suppose not. Then, there exists a project j ∈ [0, 1) such that investing either
more or less than no(j) marginally increases the expected welfare. There are two cases:
(1) there exists a possibility to profitably increase investment in some project and (2)
there exists a possibility to profitably decrease investment in some project.
(1) Suppose that there exists a possibility to profitably increase investment in some
project j. Then there exists some n such that n0(j) < n ≤ N and
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j).
Then we can write n∑
k=no(j)+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j)
+W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j)
n∑
k=no(j)+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) > 0.
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Suppose no(j) = mo. Then, ∀k > no(j) it holds:
(
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(0)
)
+
(
C(0)− C(j)
)
≤ 0
the first bracketed expression is by construction not positive whereas the second is not
positive because the function C(·) is increasing. A sum of non-positive elements cannot
be positive. A contradiction.
Suppose now that no(j) < mo. By construction it holds
W (n0(j) + 1)−W (n0(j))− C(αon0(j)+1) = 0
and for every k > n0(j) by assumption holds
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(αon0(j)+1) ≤ 0
By construction j > αon0(j)+1, so that C(j) > C(α
o
n0(j)+1). Plugging it into the expression
above, it follows
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) ≤ 0 ∀k > n0(j).
Again, a sum of non-positive elements cannot be positive. A contradiction.
(2) Suppose that there exists a possibility to profitably decrease investment in some
project j. Then there exists some n such that 0 ≤ n < n0(j) and
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j).
Then we can write
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n)− nC(j) +
 no(j)∑
k=n+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j)

0 >
no(j)∑
k=n+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j).
By construction W (no(j))−W (no(j)− 1)−C(j) > 0 and by assumption it holds for any
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k < no(j) that
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) > 0
A sum of positive elements has to be positive. A contradiction.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Using the notation of Propositions 2 and 4 the variety of R&D projects in the market
portfolio is [0, α1] and the variety of R&D projects in the optimal portfolio is [0, α
o
1]. Thus
the market will underinvest in the variety of R&D projects if and only if α1 < α
o
1. As
C(·) is increasing this is equivalent to C(α1) < C(αo1). By Propositions 2 and 4 it then
holds R(1)− r(0, N) < W (1)−W (0). Decomposing W (1) into CS(1) +R(1) and W (0)
into CS(0) +Nr(0, N) yields the desired result. Overinvestment and optimal investment
cases are proven analogously.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
As assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold, by Corollary 1 this market will underinvest in the
variety of R&D projects if and only if CS(1) − W (0) + r(0, N) > 0. Denote with q1
the quantity supplied by a monopolist with the innovation and with q0 the quantity
supplied by a single firm if no innovation is developed. As the innovation is drastic
P (q1) < P (Nq0) or equivalently q1 > Nq0. We can write the consumer surplus as the
difference between total utility and the total expense paid by consumers, so it holds
CS(1) =
∫ q1
0
P (s)ds − P (q1)q1. Welfare is total utility less the total cost of production,
so it holds W (0) =
∫ Nq0
0
P (s)ds−Nc¯(q0). Then this market will underinvest if and only
if: ∫ q1
0
P (s)ds− P (q1)q1 −
[∫ Nq0
0
P (s)ds−Nc¯(q0)
]
+ r(0, N) > 0.
Subtracting the integrals and rearranging terms gives:
∫ q1
Nq0
P (s)ds− P (q1)q1 +Nc¯(q0) + r(0, N) > 0.
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By assumption P ′(·) < 0 so that ∫ q1
Nq0
P (s)ds ≥ (q1 − Nq0)P (q1). The inequality above
will hold whenever the following inequality holds:
(q1 −Nq0)P (q1)− P (q1)q1 +Nc¯(q0) + r(0, N) > 0.
Rearranging gives:
Nc¯(q0)−Nq0P (q1) + r(0, N) > 0.
By assumption c¯′(·) ≥ 0 so that c¯(q0) =
∫ q0
0
c¯′(s)ds ≥ (q0 − 0)c¯′(0). The inequality above
will hold whenever the following inequality holds:
Nq0(c¯
′(0)− P (q1)) + r(0, N) > 0.
As r(0, N) ≥ 0 by rationality of firms and c¯′(0) > P (q1) by definition of a drastic process
innovation, the above inequality always holds.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 2
Consider first the case where αok < αk. As C(·) is increasing then it holds C(αok) <
C(αk). As assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold, then Propositions 2 and 5 hold. Applying
them yields W (k) −W (k − 1) < R(k) and decomposing the expression for W (·) yields
kR(k) + CS(k)− (k − 1)R(k − 1)− CS(k − 1) < R(k). Rearranging gives:
δ(k) =
[
(k − 1)(R(k)−R(k − 1))]+ [CS(k)− CS(k − 1)] < 0.
Hence αok < αk if and only if δ(k) < 0. The other cases follow analogously.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 2a
Observe that the proof of Proposition 1 does not require Assumption 2. Proof of Propo-
sition 2a exactly mirrors the proof of Proposition 2, except without setting r(n,N) = 0
for all n ≥ 1. In essence, Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 2a.
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A.10 Example: Process innovation in a Cournot market
As an illustrative example, consider a simple Cournot model with homogeneous products,
linear costs and linear demand. Suppose that there are three firms facing inverse demand
of the form
P (q1, q2, q3) = 1− (q1 + q2 + q3)
where qi is the quantity supplied by the firm i. Denote with c¯ the marginal cost of
production with the old technology and with c the marginal cost of production with the
new technology, where c ≤ c¯ ≤ 1. That is, firms have the possibility to develop a process
innovation which reduces their production cost from c¯ to c. The innovation is drastic if
c¯ ≥ 1 + c
2
, (2)
where the right hand side of the inequality is the price which would be obtained if there
was a monopolist with marginal cost c in the market. Suppose that the costs of research
are given by
C(j) = b
√
j
1− j , j ∈ [0, 1),
where b > 0 is a slope parameter. Observe that this choice of cost function implies
C(0) = 0 so that m = N , that is at least some of the innovation projects are developed
by all the firms in the market.
Using standard methods, the profits in Cournot markets with n firms and marginal
costs c are given by Π(n, c) = (1−c)2/(n+1)2. From this equation it is possible to derive
the ex post payoffs:
r(0, 3) =
(1− c¯)2
16
, R(1) =
(1− c)2
4
,
R(2) =
(1− c)2
9
, R(3) =
(1− c)2
16
.
In order to be able to apply Proposition 2, we have to check if Assumptions 1 and 2
hold. Assumption 2 holds whenever Equation (2) is satisfied. In addition, Assumption
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1 holds whenever c ≤ c¯ ≤ 1, which is assumed.16 Hence, Proposition 2 can be used to
characterize the equilibrium R&D portfolio.
Applying Proposition 2 yields the following k-firm frontiers for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
α3 =
R(3)2
b2 +R(3)2
,
α2 =
R(2)2
b2 +R(2)2
,
α1 =
(R(1)− r(0, 3))2
b2 + (R(1)− r(0, 3))2 .
All projects in the interval [0, α3) are developed by all three firms whereas the projects
in the interval [α3, α2) are developed by two firms. Projects in the interval [α2, α1) are
developed by just one firm whereas the projects in the interval [α1, 1) are not developed at
all. Thus, if the successful project is from the interval [0, α1), the market will successfully
develop the innovation and all firms which invested in the successful project will compete
with the production costs c. However, if the successful project is from the interval [α1, 1)
the market will not develop the innovation and all firms will compete with the production
costs c¯.
Figure 1 (in Section 4) illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio in the case where
b = 0.05, c¯ = 3/4 and c = 1/2.
Merger of two firms
Suppose now that two of the three firms merge, leaving everything else unchanged. That
is, suppose that the merger affects only the number of firms which are active in the
market. Denote with {r′, R′} payoffs after the merger and with {r, R} payoffs without
the merger. Clearly, {r, R} are the same as before. The new payoff functions are given
16If Assumption 2 is satisfied then the sufficient condition for Assumption 1 to hold is
(1− c)2
4
−
(1− c¯)2
16
≥ (1− c)
2
9
. If c¯ = 1, the inequality is satisfied. If c¯ < 1, the expression simplifies to
(
1− c
1− c¯
)2
≥
9
20
, which is always satisfied because the left-hand expression is always greater than 1.
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by:
r′(0, 2) =
(1− c¯)2
9
,
R′(1) =
(1− c)2
4
,
R′(2) =
(1− c)2
9
.
It is immediately clear that r′(0, 2) > r(0, 3) whereas R′(1) = R(1) and R′(2) = R(2).
The intuition behind this is that the merger increases profits in the market when all firms
are active, because there are fewer competitors, hence r′(0, 2) > r(0, 3). However, due to
the drastic nature of innovation, post-innovation profits only depend on the number of
firms which successfully innovated, hence R′(1) = R(1) and R′(2) = R(2). As after the
merger there are only two firms in the market, the maximum number of firms investing
in any project is at most 2.
Applying Proposition 2 yields m′ = 2 < m = 3, α′2 = α2 but α
′
1 < α1. This is in line
with results derived in Proposition 3. Figure 2 (in Section 5) graphically illustrates the
change in the market portfolio of research projects after the merger.
From Cournot to Bertrand competition
Consider again the scenario with three firms and suppose that the type of competition
changes from Cournot to Bertrand. This change can be interpreted as an increase in
the intensity of competition among the firms. How will the market portfolio of research
projects change? Applying Proposition 4, the variety of research projects developed will
increase whereas the duplication of research projects will decrease.
From above we know that with three firms engaged in a Cournot competition, the
market portfolio will be characterized by the maximum number of firms investing m and
the firm-frontiers α3, α2, and α1. The equilibrium values of the market under Bertrand
competition are denoted with a prime. When there are multiple symmetric firms com-
peting in a homogeneous goods Bertrand market, in equilibrium firms set prices equal
to marginal cost of production and earn zero profits. Hence, the payoff functions will be
r′(0, 3) = 0 and R′(2) = R′(3) = 0. The monopolist earns the same profits in both cases,
48
that is R′(1) = R(1) = (1− c)2/4.
As Assumptions 1 and 2 clearly hold, Proposition 2 can be applied. It immediately
follows that m′ = 1, hence n(j) < n′(j) for all j < α2. This drastic change in the amount
of duplication is due to the fact that firms make no profits if there is a competitor, so
firms choose to do no duplication at all. Simple calculations show that α′1 > α1. Figure
3 (in section 5) illustrates the change in the market portfolio of research projects due to
the change of competition from Cournot to Bertrand.
Market and optimal portfolios in a Cournot model
Consider again the Cournot example from the appendix A.10. Social welfare generated
in this product market by firms supplying total quantity Q is given by:
WQ =
∫ Q
0
P (s)ds−Qc =
∫ Q
0
(1− s)ds−Qc = Q
(
1− Q
2
− c
)
, (3)
where c is the constant marginal cost of production. Using standard results, the total
quantity supplied in a Cournot market with n firms is given by
Q(n, c) =
n(1− c)
n+ 1
.
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and simple calculations show that Assumption 4 holds as
well. Hence Propositions 5 and 6 can be applied. Proposition 6 immediately informs us
that there will be underinvestment in the variety of research projects. Figure 4 illustrates
the difference between the optimal and the market portfolio in this market.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,
Diversification, and Growth.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105 (1997), pp.
709–751.
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P., and Vickers, J. “Competition and Innova-
49
tion: An Inverted-U Relationship.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120
(2005), pp. 701–728.
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., and Griffith, R. “Competition, Imitation
and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation.” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
68 (2001), pp. 467–492.
Akcigit, U. and Kerr, W.R. “Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations.” PIER
Working Paper no. 10-035, 2010.
Akcigit, U. and Liu, Q. “The Role of Information in Innovation and Competition.”
Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming).
Arrow, K. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention.” In The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962.
Bester, H. and Petrakis, E. “The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated
Industry.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 11 (1993), pp.
519–534.
Bhattacharya, S. and Mookherjee, D. “Portfolio Choice in Research and Devel-
opment.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1986), pp. 594–605.
Cabral, L. “Bias in Market R&D Portfolios.” International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization, Vol. 12 (1994), pp. 533–547.
Chatterjee, K. and Evans, R. “Rivals Search for Buried Treasure: Competition and
Duplication in R&D.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004), pp. 160–183.
Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. ”The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios.” The
Economic Journal, Vol. 97 (1987), pp. 581–595.
Farrell, J., Gilbert, R.J., and Katz, M.L. “Market Structure, Organizational
Structure, and R&D Diversity. In R. Arnott, B. Greenwald, R. Kanbur, and B.
Nalebuff, eds., Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
Fershtman, C. and Rubinstein, A. “A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Pro-
cedures.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 441 (1997), pp. 432–441.
Gilbert, R. “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are We in the Competition-Innovation
50
Debate? In J. Adam, J. Lerner, and S. Stern, eds., Innovation Policy and the Econ-
omy 6, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.
Klette, T. and de Meza, D. “Is the Market Biased against Risky R&D?” RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1986), pp. 133–139.
Kwon, I. “R&D Portfolio and Market Structure.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 120
(2010), pp. 313–323.
Mankiw N.G. and Whinston, M.D. ”Free Entry and Social Inefficiency.” RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1986), pp. 48–58.
Quirmbach, H.C. “R&D: Competition, Risk, and Performance.” RAND Journal of
Economics, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 157–197.
Reynolds, S.S. and Isaac, R.M. “Stochastic Innovation and Product Market Orga-
nization.” Economic Theory, Vol. 2 (1992), pp. 525–545.
Robinson, C.K. “Leap-frog and Other Forms of Innovation: Protecting the Future
for High-Tech and Emerging Industries Through Merger Enforcement.” Address
before the American Bar Association, Chicago, IL, June 10, 1999.
Rubinfeld, D.L. and Hoven, J. “Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement” In J. Ellig,
ed., Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation and An-
titrust Issues, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Sah, R.K. and Stiglitz, J.E. “The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number
of Firms.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 (1987), pp. 98–108.
Schmidt., K.M. “Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition.” The Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 64 (1997), pp. 191–213.
Schmutzler, A. “Competition and Investment - A Unified Approach?” International
Journal of Industrial Organization (2013), pp. 477–487.
Segal, I. and Whinston, M.D. “Antitrust in Innovative Industries.” The American
Economic Review, Vol. 97 (2007), pp. 1703–1730.
Sena, V. “The Return of the Prince of Denmark: A Survey on Recent Developments
in the Economics of Innovation.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 114 (2004), pp.
F312–F332.
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Horizontal
51
Merger Guidelines, (2010). http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.html. Accessed on May 19, 2015.
van Cayseele, P.J.G. “Market Structure and Innovation: a Survey of the Last Twenty
Years.” De Economist (1998), pp. 391–417.
Vives, X. “Innovation and Competitive Pressure.” The Journal of Industrial Economics,
Vol. 56 (2008), pp. 419–469.
52
B Online Appendix — Not for Publication
The Road Not Taken:
Competition and the R&D Portfolio
Igor Letina, University of Zurich
In this Appendix I consider four extensions of the basic model. First two deal with
the possibility that a merger could generate efficiencies which could overturn the result
that a merger decreases the variety of approaches to innovation. In Section B.2 I consider
a mixed strategy equilibirum and show that the equilibrium structure and determinants
of comparative static results found for pure strategy equilibria are robust. Finally, in
Section B.3 I consider the case when the research budgets are limited or when financing
of research is costly. Proofs are presented sequentially in the end of the Appendix.
B.1 Efficiency defense
General cost reduction
Consider the original setting, but suppose that if two firms merge, they become more
efficient at developing innovations. That is, suppose that for the merged firm the fixed
cost of developing any given approach j is given by C˜(j; ) : [0, 1) → R+ such that
C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j) for all j. Like C, assume that C˜ is continuous, differentiable, strictly
increasing and that limj→1 C˜(j; ) = ∞. Finally, suppose that in this setting  captures
the size of the efficiency gains resulting from the merger, such that ∂C˜(j; )/∂ < 0.
Simple functional forms that satisfy these assumptions (for the appropriate domain of )
are: (i) additive C˜(j; ) = C(j)−  and (ii) multiplicative C˜(j; ) = (1− )C(j). Let the
number of symmetric firms with innovation cost functions C(j) in the pre-merger market
be N . Suppose that after the merger, the merged firm has the cost function C˜(j; ) and
that the remaining N − 2 firms are active with cost functions C(j).
In this setting, if the efficiency gain from the merger is sufficiently large, there will be
no loss of diversity in the approaches to innovation as a consequence of the merger.
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Proposition 7 (Merger with general cost reductions).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and that the merger results in efficiency gains
as above. Then:
1. A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
2. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1),
where α˜1 is given by C˜(α˜1; ) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
3. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then the
merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
C(α1)− C˜(α1; ) ≥ r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N). (4)
From Proposition 3 we know that a merger, via the Arrow effect, reduces the incentives
to invest. This is captured by the right-hand side of the inequality (4). However, Propo-
sition 7 states that if the efficiency caused by the merger is large enough, which is given
by the left-hand side of the inequality (4), it can outweigh the decrease in the incentive
to invest. In this case, the merger does not lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches
to innovation. In the case of additive efficiency gains, that is if C˜(j; ) = C(j) − ,
the inequality (4) would simplify to  ≥ r(0, N − 1) − r(0, N). In the case of multi-
plicative efficiency gains, that is if C˜(j; ) = (1 − )C(j), the inequality (4) simplifies to
C(α1) ≥ r(0, N − 1) − r(0, N). It is clear that there always exists  large enough such
that these inequalities are satisfied, and that such a merger would not lead to a decrease
in the variety of approaches to innovation.
Approach-specific synergies
In the previous section, I considered a situation in which a merger between any two
firms leads to the same efficiency gains. Now, suppose that each firm has some specific
knowledge and that if the two firms merged, they could combine this specific knowledge
in a way that would enable the merged entity to conduct research over some specific
interval of approaches more efficiently. In this setting, it will not only be the size of
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the efficiency gains that will be required for a successful efficiency defense, but also that
the efficiency gains occurs over approaches that would not have been developed in the
post-merger market absent the efficiency gains.
For concreteness, consider this simple extension of the model. Suppose that each firm
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is located on the unit line in an equidistant manner. That is, the location
of the firm is given by i/(N + 1). Firm’s location represents its specific knowledge. On
it its own, this knowledge is worthless. However, suppose that firm i merged with some
firm l ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i 6= l. Then the merged entity would receive efficiency gains over an
interval midway between the location of the firms i and l. That is, the merged entity is
more efficient over an interval
[
i+ l
2(N + 1)
− δ, i+ l
2(N + 1)
+ δ
)
for some 0 < δ ≤ 1/(N + 1).17 For simplicity, suppose that on the above interval the cost
of developing an approach is zero for the merged entity. That is, a firm which has not
merged has the innovation cost function C(j) and the merged firm (where the merging
firms are i and l) has the innovation cost function
C˜i,l(j) =

0 if j ∈
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
C(j) otherwise
.
In this setting, a merger will not lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches if
the efficiency gain covers large enough interval (δ is large enough) and if the efficiency
gain occurs over projects which would not be developed absent the efficiency gain. The
latter depends on which firms actually merge. Thus, for the same size of the efficiency
gain from the merger, some mergers will lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches
whereas others will not.
Proposition 8 (Merger with approach-specific synergies).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and that the merger results in efficiency gains
17The upper bound is a simplification that ensures that efficiency gains are always in the unit interval.
It would be straightforward to remove it, at the cost of more cumbersome notation.
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as above. Then, if firms i and l merge:
1. A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
2. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1) ∪[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
, where α˜1 is given by C(α˜1) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
3. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then the
merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
∫
x∈[0,α˜1)∪[ i+l2(N+1)−δ, i+l2(N+1)+δ)
dx ≥ α1. (5)
As the innovation cost function for the merged firm is not strictly increasing, the set
of developed approaches need not be convex any more. However, the intuition is clear
— the efficiency gain must be both large enough and must materialize over the projects
which would not have been developed otherwise for the efficiency defense to be successful.
B.2 Mixed strategies
Consider the original setting, but suppose that firms are using mixed strategies. As a
simplifying assumption, I will consider only the following pure strategy space
Im = {0} ∪
{
[0, j) : j ∈ (0, 1)
}
and I will look only at symmetric mixed strategy equilibria (SMSE). Because now the
pure strategy of a firm is restricted to choosing an interval [0, j), it can be identified with
the upper bound of the interval j. Denote with fi(j) the density that the firm i chooses
the interval [0, j) and with Fi(j) the related cumulative distribution function.
Proposition 9 (Characterization of SMSE). Suppose N = 2 and the Assumptions 1 and
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2 hold. Then the unique SMSE is characterized by the cumulative distribution function:
F (j) =

0 if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) < 0
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) ∈ [0, 1]
1 if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) > 1
for j ∈ [0, 1).
Suppose that R(2) − C(0) > 0. In pure actions, by Proposition 2 it holds: m = 2,
C(α1) = R(1) − r(0, N) and C(α2) = R(2). Thus, both firms will invest in the interval
[0, α1), only one firm will invest in the interval [α1, α2) and no firm will invest in [α2, 0).
Now consider SMSE. By Proposition 9, for j ∈ [0, α1) it holds F (j) = 0, thus both firms
invest in this interval with probability 1. For j ∈ (α1, α2) it holds 0 < F (j) < 1, thus
firms invest with some probability less then one. If j ∈ [α2, 0), then F (j) = 1, so that
firms do not invest in this interval. Similar results hold if R(2) − C(0) ≤ 0. Thus, the
basic structure of the model is the same in both pure and mixed strategy equilibria. In
particular the k-firm frontiers are the same. Furthermore, comparative statics results
regarding variety of projects undertaken remain qualitatively the same, as anything that
affects the one-firm frontier has qualitatively the same effect both in pure action and
in mixed strategy equilibria. Figure 8 illustrates the difference between the (expected)
equilibrium market portfolios for the Cournot duopoly example from the appendix A.10.
The mixed strategy equilibrium is “smoother” than the pure strategy equilibrium. The
reason for this is that the integer problem is not present in the mixed strategy setting.
In pure strategy equilibrium, some projects have higher expected profits than others (i.e.
project α2 +  is more profitable than α2−  for some small positive ). In mixed strategy
equilibria, all projects in the interval where the mixing occurs have the same expected
profits.
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Figure 8: Symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
B.3 Limited budget and costly financing
This section considers the case where firms face an exogenous constraint on their research
budgets. This constraint can take the form of a budget constraint, or it can (equivalently)
take the form of costly financing for research. The main result is that a binding budget
constraint or a costly source of financing imposes a positive opportunity cost on invest-
ments in research projects, but that the main mechanics of the model remain unchanged.
First, suppose that there are two firms in a market and that each firm has a budget
B and suppose that the budget is binding, in the sense that firms would want to invest
more in research if they had more resources.18 Then the following result is obtained:
Proposition 10 (Equilibrium in a game with limited budget).
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that there are two firms with a budget
B. Then, a PSE always exists, the induced PSE market portfolio is unique and any
investment plan which induces a portfolio identical to the market PSE portfolio is itself
a PSE. Furthermore, there exists a unique β > 0 such that:
1. the maximum number of firms investing in any project mb is given by
mb = max
{1,2}
n s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > β.
18Formally, if m = 2 then 2B < 2
∫ α2
0
C(j)dj +
∫ α1
α2
C(j)dj and if m = 1 then 2B <
∫ α1
0
C(j)dj.
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2. Firm frontiers are determined by
R(1)− r(0, N)− C(αb1) =
R(mb)− r(mb − 1, N)− C(αbm) = β.
3. Let αbm+1 = 0 and α
b
0 = 1. The total expenditure is
m
∫ αbm
0
C(j)dj + (m− 1)
∫ αbm−1
αbm
C(j)dj = 2B.
Then the PSE portfolio nb(j) is given by
nb(j) = k if j ∈ [αbk+1, αbk).
As can be seen from conditions 1. and 2., the basic form of the market equilibrium
portfolio will remain unchanged. The only difference is that the budget constraint will
impose positive opportunity cost β on the choice of research projects, as opposed to the
unconstrained equilibrium where the opportunity costs was 0. In the scenario where firms
can borrow unlimited funds at some positive price, the equilibrium characterized above
still holds, but now β is exogenously given and as a function of the cost of financing.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 7
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition 7 in turn. The proof is
analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 7 (Existence). A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma 7 in three steps. Step 1 constructs the
candidate equilibrium investment plan I˜. Step 2 proves that no firm can increase its
expected profits by making additional investments. Step 3 proves that no firm can increase
its expected profits by reducing investments. Finally, notice that any deviation from the
investment plan I˜ can be written as a collection of investments and divestments and by
Steps 2 and 3, each such investment and divestment decreases expected profits and hence
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any such collection must decrease expected profits. Thus, no firm can profitably deviate
from the investment plan I˜ and then, by definition, I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N−1}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N − 1)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem
always exists.
Next, calculate each α˜1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C˜(α˜1; ) =
R(2)− C(α2) =
R(3)− C(α3) =
...
R(m)− C(αm) = 0.
By construction it holds R(m)−r(m−1, N)−C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1 the reward
of innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As C˜(j; ) ≤
C(j), the inequality also holds for the merged firm. As costs of innovation approach
infinity as j → 1, values α˜1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Furthermore, as C(j) is increasing, C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j), and by applying Assumption 1 it is
easy to see that α˜1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.
Observe that N − 1 ≥ m. Label the merged firm with subscript i = 1 and all
other firms with i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}. For the merged firm, let I˜1 = [0, α˜1). For each
i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let I˜i = [0, αi). For each i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , N − 1} let I˜i = ∅. I will
demonstrate that I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
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profits by making additional investments.
Proof. First observe that for all firms i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} the argument is identical as
in the proof of Proposition 1, as the investment decision of the firm only depends on
their investment costs and the number of firms investing in any given project. Thus we
only need to show that the merged firm cannot increase profits by making additional
investments. This holds by construction. The merged firm already invests in the entire
interval [0, α˜1). For any j > α˜1 it holds R(1) − r(0, N − 1) − C˜(j; ) < 0 as C˜(j; ) is
strictly increasing in j. Thus, no additional profitable investments exist for the merged
firm.
Step 3. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
profits by decreasing investments.
Proof. Similar to the argument in the previous step, it is sufficient to show that the
merged firm cannot increase profits by decreasing investments. First, observe that for
j ∈ [α2, α˜1) the investment is profitable as it holds R(1) − r(0, N − 1) − C˜(j; ) > 0
for all j in the interval. For all j in [0, α2) it holds R(n(j, I˜)) − C(j) > 0 (otherwise
non-merged firms would have an incentive to divest) and as C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j), it also holds
R(n(j, I˜))− C˜(j; ) > 0 for all j ∈ [0, α2). Hence, the merged firm cannot increase profits
by divesting.
Lemma 8. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is
[0, α˜1), where α˜1 is given by C˜(α˜1; ) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, either there exist an interval l ⊆ [0, α˜1) where no firm invests,
or there exists an interval l′ ⊆ [α˜1, 1) where at least one firm invests, or both. First
suppose that an interval l exists. As C˜(j; ) is strictly increasing, then for all j ∈ l
it holds C˜(j; ) < R(1) − r(0, N − 1). Hence the merged firm can profitably invest
in the subset of l. Next, suppose an interval l′ exists. Observe that for any j > α˜1
it holds C(j) ≥ C˜(j; ) > R(1) − r(0, N − 1). By Assumption 1 it then also holds
C(j) ≥ C˜(j; ) > R(k) for all k ≥ 2. Thus, no firm can profitably invest any subset of
l′.
61
Lemma 9. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then
the merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
C(α1)− C˜(α1; ) ≥ r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N).
Proof. The merger does not reduce variety if and only if α˜1 ≥ α1. As C˜(j; ) is strictly
increasing, this will hold if and only if C˜(α1; ) ≤ R(1) − r(0, N − 1). By Proposition
2, we know that C(α1) = R(1) − r(0, N). Subtracting the above inequality, the claim
follows.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 8
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition 8 in turn. The proof is
analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 10 (Existence). A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma 10 in three steps, analogous to the proof of
Lemma 7.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N−1}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N − 1)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem
always exists.
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Next, calculate each α˜1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C(α˜1) =
R(2)− C(α2) =
R(3)− C(α3) =
...
R(m)− C(αm) = 0.
By construction it holds R(m)−r(m−1, N)−C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1 the reward of
innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As costs of innovation
approach infinity as j → 1, values α˜1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by the Intermediate Value
Theorem. Furthermore, by Assumption 1, it is easy to see that α˜1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.
Observe that N − 1 ≥ m. Label the merged firm with subscript i = 1 and all other
firms with i ∈ {2, . . . , N−1}. For the merged firm, let I˜1 = [0, α˜1)∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
.
For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let I˜i = [0, αi). For each i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , N − 1} let I˜i = ∅. I
will demonstrate that I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
profits by making additional investments.
Proof. For firms i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} the argument is identical as in the proof of Propo-
sition 7. Thus we only need to show that the merged firm cannot increase profits
by making additional investments. The merged firm already invests in the entire set
[0, α˜1) ∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
. For any j > α˜1 and j 6∈
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
it
holds R(1) − r(0, N − 1) − C˜(j) < 0 as C(j) is strictly increasing. Thus, no additional
profitable investments exist for the merged firm.
Step 3. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected
profits by decreasing investments.
Proof. Similar to the argument in the previous step, it is sufficient to show that the
merged firm cannot increase profits by decreasing investments. First, observe that for
j ∈ [α2, α˜1) the investment is profitable as it holds R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C(j) > 0 for all j in
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the interval. For all j in [0, α2) it holds R(n(j, I˜))−C(j) > 0 (otherwise non-merged firms
would have an incentive to divest) and as C˜(j) ≤ C(j), it also holds R(n(j, I˜))−C˜(j) > 0
for all j ∈ [0, α2). For all j ∈
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
the investment is costless. Hence,
the merged firm cannot increase profits by divesting.
Lemma 11. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is
[0, α˜1) ∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
, where α˜1 is given by C(α˜1) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, either there exists an interval l ⊆ [0, α˜1) or an interval
l′ ⊆
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
where no firm invests, or there exists an interval l′′ ⊆ [0, 1)\(
[0, α˜1) ∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
))
where at least one firm invests. First suppose that
an interval l exists. Because by construction it holds C(j; ) < R(1)− r(0, N − 1) for all
j < α˜1, any firm can profitably invest in the set l. Next, suppose l
′ exists. The merged
firm can invest in the set l′ without any cost, hence it can increase its expected profit
by investing. Finally, suppose an interval l′′ exists. Observe that for any j > α˜1 and
j 6∈
[
i+l
2(N+1)
− δ, i+l
2(N+1)
+ δ
)
it holds C˜(j) > R(1)− r(0, N −1). By Assumption 1 it then
also holds C(j) ≥ C˜(j) > R(k) for all k ≥ 2. Thus, no firm can profitably invest any
subset of l′′.
Lemma 12. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1,
then the merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
∫
x∈[0,α˜1)∪[ i+l2(N+1)−δ, i+l2(N+1)+δ)
dx ≥ α1.
Proof. Without the merger, the set of developed approaches by Proposition 2 is [0, α1).
The result follows by Claim 2 of the Proposition.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the firm 2 invests according to some probability
density function f2, with the cumulative density function F2. Consider any pure action
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x1 of firm 1. The profit of the firm 1 can be expressed as:
pi1(x1|F2) =−
∫ x1
0
C(j)dj +
∫ x1
0
[∫ x2
0
R(2)dj +
∫ x1
x2
R(1)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x2)dx2+
+
∫ 1
x1
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ 1
x2
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x2)dx2.
Deriving:
dpi1(x1|F2)
dx1
=− C(x1) +
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ x1
x1
R(1)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x1)−
−
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x1)+
+
∫ x1
0
[R(1)− r(0, 2)] f2(x2)dx2 +
∫ 1
x1
R(2)f2(x2)dx2
and simplifying:
dpi1(x1|F2)
dx1
= −C(x1) + [R(1)− r(0, 2)]F2(x1) +R(2) (1− F2(x1)) .
Next, use the assumption that the equilibrium is symmetric, that is F1 = F2 = F . In
equilibrium it has to hold dpi1(x1|F )/dx1 = 0 for all x1 in the support of f . This condition
is uniquely satisfied by
F˜ (j) =
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2)
for j in the support of f .
Observe that F˜ is strictly increasing and, for all j such that F˜ (j) < 0 it follows that
dpi1(x1, F )/dx1 > 0, and for all j such that F˜ (j) > 1 it follows that dpi1(x1, F2)/dx1 < 0.
Hence, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by the profile (F, F ) where
F (j) =

0 if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) < 0
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) ∈ [0, 1]
1 if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) > 1
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for j ∈ [0, 1).
B.7 Proof of Proposition 10
I prove this statement in three steps. First I show that some β satisfying all conditions
in the proposition always exists and is unique. Next, I construct an investment plan
inducing the same portfolio as the one in Proposition 10. Finally I show that the con-
structed investment plan is an equilibrium and that any investment plan inducing the
same portfolio is an equilibrium as well.
Lemma 13. β always exists and is unique.
Proof. Define functions ψ1(β) : [0, β1]→ R+, ψ2(β) : [0, β2]→ R+ such that
ψ1(β) =
∫ C−1(R(1)−r(0,2)−β)
0
C(j)dj
ψ2(β) =
∫ C−1(R(2)−β)
0
C(j)dj +
∫ C−1(R(1)−r(0,2)−β)
0
C(j)dj
with β1 = R(1) − r(0, 2) − C(0) and β2 = R(2) − C(0). As C(·) is continuous, strictly
increasing and defined on an interval, its inverse is continuous and strictly increasing as
well. Hence both ψ1(β) and ψ1(β) are continuous and strictly decreasing. Furthermore,
by Assumption 1 it holds β1 ≥ β2.
Either (i) ψ1(β2) ≥ 2B or (ii) ψ1(β2) < 2B. If (i) is true, ψ1(β2) ≥ 2B and ψ1(β1) =
0 < 2B. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists some β∗ ∈ [β2, β1) such that
ψ1(β∗) = 2B and furthermore β∗ is unique because ψ1(β) is strictly decreasing. Observe
that β∗ ∈ [R(2) − C(0), β1), hence R(1) − r(0, 2) − C(0) > β∗ and R(2) − C(0) ≤ β∗.
Thus, by the condition 1. of Proposition 10 we have mb = 1. By the condition 2. the
firm frontier is αb1 = C
−1(R(1) − r(0, 2) − β∗). Finally, the condition 3. holds because∫ αb1
0
C(j)dj = 2B by construction. Hence, β∗ uniquely satisfies all three conditions of the
Proposition 10.
If (ii) is true, then ψ2(β2) < 2B and ψ2(0) > 2B, by the assumption of the binding
budget constraint. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists some β∗ ∈ (0, β2)
such that ψ2(β∗) = 2B and furthermore β∗ is unique because ψ2(β) is strictly de-
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creasing. Observe that β∗ ∈ (0, β2), hence R(2) − C(0) > β∗. Thus, by the condi-
tion 1. of Proposition 10 we have mb = 2. By the condition 2. the firm frontiers are
αb1 = C
−1(R(1)− r(0, 2)− β∗) and αb2 = C−1(R(2)− β∗). Finally, the condition 3. holds
because
∫ αb2
0
C(j)dj +
∫ αb1
0
C(j)dj = 2B by construction. Hence, β∗ uniquely satisfies all
three conditions of the Proposition 10.
Lemma 14. An equilibrium inducing portfolio equivalent to the one characterized in
Proposition 10 can always be constructed.
Proof. Either m = 2 or m = 1. If m = 1, then it holds
∫ αb1
0
C(j)dj = 2B. Then there
exists a point x such that 0 < x < αb1 and
∫ x
0
C(j)dj = B and
∫ αb1
x
C(j)dj = B. Let one
firm invest in the interval [0, x) and the other firm in the interval [x, αb1). This investment
plan generates a portfolio equivalent to the one characterized.
If m = 2, then it holds 2
∫ αb2
0
C(j)dj +
∫ αb1
αb2
C(j)dj = 2B. Then there exists a point
x such that αb2 ≤ x ≤ αb1 and
∫ x
0
C(j)dj = B and
∫ αb2
0
C(j)dj +
∫ αb1
x
C(j)dj = B. Let
one firm invest in the interval [0, x) and the other firm in the set [0, αb2) ∪ [x, αb1). This
investment plan generates a portfolio equivalent to the one characterized.
Lemma 15. The investment plan constructed in Lemma 14 is an equilibrium and any
investment plan inducing the same portfolio is an equilibrium as well.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, with the opportunity cost
equal to β as opposed to 0.
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